The Decline of Scottish Common Sense Realism (Part Five)

Thomas Reid's tombstone

Reid on Perception

The Decline of SCSR

Although more influential during his lifetime than was Hume, one question lurking throughout this discussion is why did Reid and SCSR fall into such relative obscurity so quickly if common sense is self-evident?  The obvious reason is that Reid’s Inquiry was completely overshadowed soon after its publication by Immanuel Kant’s ground-breaking Critique of Pure Reason (1781).  Reid’s philosophy of common sense (along with the Scottish school associated with him), was openly maligned by Kant, who did not read English.  Kant curtly labeled “common sense philosophy” as mere opinion.  It did not help that the notoriously poor translation of Reid’s work Kant had read erroneously translated “common sense” as “public rumor” (Robinson, How Is Nature Possible, 120, n. 6).

Kant dismissed any attempt to establish a rigorous systematic philosophy based upon the opinions of the unlearned masses utilizing something as crude as public rumor (i.e., public opinion).  Common sense had much in common, Kant noted, with the Popularphilosophie, as it was then known and taught in Germany.  Kant, who claimed to be troubled by his personal mania for systematizing, expressed open disdain for the popular philosophy then in vogue.  Kant was a vocal champion of the so-called Schulphilosophie (the philosophy of the schools–i.e., that of professional philosophers).  Kant complained that a philosophy like SCSR could be used by any “wind-bag” to confound even the most sophisticated philosopher–a point which actually works in Reid’s favor!  Kant’s criticism of SCSR boils down to the fact that common sense is not sophisticated, too simplistic, and amounts to nothing but a “herd mentality.”  This is a charge which has been repeated often by critics of SCSR since the days of Reid.  No doubt, such a back-handed dismissal by someone as influential as Kant pushed Reid and SCSR deep into philosophical backwater.

But as recent Kant scholarship has convincingly shown (i.e., Manfred Kuehn, Karl Ameriks, Daniel Robinson), Kant’s negative assessment of SCSR widely misses the mark.  Several of Kant’s proposals were actually quite similar to those previously advocated by Reid.  Many of Kant’s German contemporaries were greatly influenced by the Scottish philosophy and Reid in particular.  When pressed to explain how it was that the a priori categories of his “transcendental idealism” were necessary to explain human sense perception, Kant defaulted to “Mutterwitz,” i.e., to “mother nature” (Kant, Critique, A133-5/B172-4)–a notion virtually identical to that of Reid, who spoke of his first principles as coming from the “mint of nature,” i.e., from God who made us with such capacities  At the end of the day, Kant, quite ironically, ends up where Reid begins–we must utilize a priori categories because we are made this way.  But Kant has no explanation for “mother wit,” while Reid does.

Reid scholars have catalogued additional reasons for the diminished impact of SCSR after Reid’s death.  These include the fact that Reid’s philosophy came under withering attack from a significant English philosopher who came to prominence two generations later, John Stuart Mill (1806-1873).  Mill was the chief proponent of utilitarianism, which held that moral philosophy must give due consideration to the “greater good” for individuals and society, and as such cannot be grounded in moral first principles as Reid insisted.  Mill complained that Reid’s appeal to intuition was just another way of promoting self-interest, not the common good.

Yet, another reason suggested for SCSR’s decline is that the compiler of Reid’s Works, Sir William Hamilton, ham-fistedly attempted to merge his own Kantian affinities with Reid’s SCSR, a matter compounded by the fact that Hamilton was not anywhere near the capable spokesman for SCSR that Reid was.  Finally, some have noted the Scottish Enlightenment simply had run its course, especially when Scottish Universities began to hire non-Reidian professors more inclined to utilitarianism, or the Continental philosophies of Kant and Hegel.  Wolterstorff attributes this, in part, to the rise of Hegel’s imprint upon modern philosophical development which left Reid behind under a wave of continental rationalists, British empiricists (Wolterstorff defends the notion that Reid was neither) and the Kantian-Hegelian synthesis (Wolterstorff, Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology, x).

No doubt, the chief reason for the decline of Reid’s prior wide influence was the triumph of Kant’s “transcendental idealism” over Reid’s “common sense.”

The Resurgence of Reid and Common Sense

Reid on Perception (Part Four)

Reid on "Common Sense"

Reid on “Perception” -- Reid v. Kant and Van Til (Round One)

 
Kant argued that what we perceive with our senses is not “the thing in itself,” since sense data must be mediated through our a priori categories.  We all may see the same object which exists independently of our minds.  Yet, our experience of that object is mediated through our a priori categories, determining the outcome of our sensations.  If I cannot be sure that what I and others see is the same thing, even if we are looking at the same object, does this not lead to some form of skepticism despite Kant’s objections to the contrary?  

Our understanding of perception is especially important to keep in mind when thinking about the contemporary debate over apologetic method between “evidentialists” (who make appeal to “facts” of Christianity as objective and “true”) and “presuppositionalists,” (who believe that our a priori categories, in this case, belief in the God of the Bible, are all-determinative to the knowing process, so that it is something like a fool’s errand to attempt to argue for the truth of Christianity merely using facts).  According to presuppositionalists, the best way to defend the faith is assume the truth of Christianity and challenge unbelievers on grounds of inconsistency, factual error, and personal prejudices.

The founder of the modern school of presuppositionalism, Cornelius Van Til (1895-1987) of Westminster Theological Seminary was “categorical” (pun intended) in his rejection of Kant’s absolute idealism and the latter’s distinction between noumenal and phenomenal realms (Van Til, A Survey of Christian Epistemology, 103-115).  But Van Til was greatly influenced by two Dutch Reformed theologians of an earlier generation, Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920) and Herman Bavinck (1854-1921), both of whom utilized Kant’s a priori categories to explain how it is that we as fallen humans prejudicially (and sinfully) interpret the world around us–especially in light of the biblical data regarding the damage done to the human intellect and will by Adam’s fall into sin.  

The traditional Reformed understanding of the effects of human sinfulness (including the so-called noetic effects of sin), when set forth through a priori categories such as Kant's, provided the ground for Abraham Kuyper to contend that the Fall completely effects the knowing process–so much so that Christians and non-Christians (through differing sets of a priori categories–one regenerate and one unregenerate) can properly be described as engaging in two kinds of science (note: you can insert any other human discipline here).  There is a regenerate way of pursuing science, grounded in regenerate a priori categories, and there is an unregenerate way of doing science, grounded in sinful a priori categories.  In this scheme, the gap between the way a Christian thinks and a non-Christian thinks amounts to a chasm.  Van Til agreed and went so far as to state, “to the extent that the two systems of interpretation are self consistently expressed it will be an all-out global war between them” (Van Til, “Introduction” in Warfield, Inspiration and Authority of the Bible, 24).

This is also reflected in Van Til’s oft-repeated comments to the effect that it is useless to appeal to common ground or “common notions” upon which Christians (regenerate) and non-Christians (unregenerate) can both agree.  God tells us (through Scripture) what things truly are and what they actually mean.  In sense, this is where the discussion begins and ends for a regenerate person with regenerate a priori categories–they think God’s thoughts after him, while non-Christians cannot.  This is why, according to Van Tilians, Christians should never appeal to non-Christians on the basis of facts supposedly held in common, when there cannot be any such thing.  Instead, Christian apologetics ought to challenge non-Christian presuppositions while making the case that the world cannot make sense apart from Christian presuppositions and regenerate a priories.  Christians and non-Christians will see the facts around them very differently (i.e., those things which occur in ordinary history in the external world in which we live)  As Van Til puts it, “the only `proof’ of the Christian position is that unless its truth is presupposed there is no possibility of proving anything at all.  The actual state of affairs as preached by Christianity is the necessary foundation of `proof’ itself” (Cornelius Van Til, My Credo, 21).

If true, this would be a vindication of Kant and present a serious challenge to Reid’s notion of first principles and common sense which make appeal not to regeneration and a priori categories, but to first principles and common sense which are universally held in common by believer and unbeliever alike even after Adam's fall.  Here, we see the fundamental divide between two approaches to Christian apologetics within Reformed circles, evidentialism and presuppositionalism.  There is good reason why someone like B. B. Warfield was thoroughly perplexed by Kuyper’s instance on two kinds of science (one regenerate, one not), along with with Kuyper’s and Bavinck’s depreciation of Christian evidences, such as Jesus’ resurrection, which make appeal to knowable and verifiable events of history (Warfield, “Review” of Bavinck’s De Zekherheid des Geloofs, 117).  Warfield followed Reid, while Kuyper, Bavinck, and Van Til, followed Kant.

For Van Til, there can be no such thing as a “brute fact,” or “uninterpreted" fact.  Van Til expressed great reservation about Reid’s view of perception in relation to facts.  “In the case of Scottish Realism there is, to say the least, an undue emphasis given to the attempt to establish a realism or independence of the object over against the subject” (Van Til, A Survey of Christian Epistemology, 132).  In making this comment, Van Til openly sided with Kant over Reid. 

But Van Til seems to be of two minds when it comes to Kant’s handling of "facts."  While rejecting Kant’s system, Van Til clearly embraced Kant’s understanding of how we experience and know the external world–the subjective a priori categories are all-determinative.  Van Til claims Kant’s “Copernican Revolution” provides “a fully consistent presentation of one system of interpretation over against the other.  For the first time in history the stage is set for a head-on collision” (Van Til, “Introduction” Warfield, Inspiration and Authority of the Bible, 24).  If Kant is right about the necessity of a priori categories determining the meaning of sensations coming from the external world, then facts and their interpretation are indeed one thing.  With this notion, Van Til is in full agreement.  What a Christian sees as evidence for Jesus’ resurrection, a non-Christian may see as evidence of a mythological tale invented by Jesus’ followers.

Perhaps talk show host-psychologist Dr. Phil provides a helpful illustration when he quips “perception is reality.”  Dr. Phil says this of someone who is obviously misinterpreting and distorting reality.  Exposing such is presumably the reason why such a person is a guest on his program in the first place.  Dr. Phil has every hope, it seems, of convincing the troubled person that their misguided perception is not reality.  If such perceptions are indeed ultimate, there would be no possibility of any further useful discussion.  The only remaining option to provide any relief would be the prescribing of medication.  

The very possibility of exposing ill-conceived perceptions is one hint that Van Til’s notion of facts and their interpretation being one is not so air-tight after all.  What if Reid is right about how we perceive the world and that we must assume certain things to be true to even talk about the matter of how and why common sense works?  Reality grounds perception–or ought to.  For Reid, what is presupposed is not the entire content of the Christian faith, nor even the authority of Scripture–as it is for Van Til.  What is presupposed by Reid is that all people think in a common way, and are able to do so because God made them with the ability to do so.  Reid’s focus is on epistemological method grounded in human nature, not a priori categories or prior mental content.

So what does this have to do facts and their interpretation?  To my knowledge, Reid never addressed this matter as we are doing here.  Reid is not doing Christian apologetics, rather, he’s refuting Hume and writing before Kant.  But I do think Reid would be very comfortable affirming that within the context of human life, certain things are “self-evident.”  But facts are “self-evident” because they occur in a context–not as “brute facts.”  

An analogy might be useful to flesh this point out a bit further.  Consider the matter of interpreting facts as like attending a play.  Suppose you were to walk in mid-play, say during act 7, scene 2.  You witness a character speak, and then make an insulting gesture to another character.  You then immediately walk out of the play.  Even though you heard the words spoken and witnessed the gesture, you would have no idea of what the words or gesture means, nor why they were important to the story.  No "brute facts" here. 

But things are quite different if you watch the entire play.  To get some context, before attending the play you might read several reviews, and you may even have done some research on the playwright.  You also know in advance that some play-goers will interpret the characters or the story line differently than the playwright intended.  But the play–specifically act 7, scene 2–would make much more sense to you, once you who know who the character is, and why his insult figures so prominently in the plot line of the larger story.  You understand that you cannot infallibly interpret the play by reading the playwright’s notes, nor can you possibly understand why every character was present during particular scenes, or why they were given the particular lines they were.  Yet, you would not need to do so, nor would you ever expect to do so, to enjoy the play which unfolds scene by scene, one scene building upon another.  When you watch the play in its entirely, you can figure out what was going on, because you now have the context to understand what you saw in act 7, scene 2.  So it is with facts–they always occur in a context.

This context is what Reid’s notion of common sense provides us.  Facts never occur in isolation from other facts.  There is always a context for our experience of the external world.  In the case of Christ’s resurrection–the critical fact for any discussion of Christian apologetics–the context (i.e., the story line of the play) is the Old Testament’s prediction of the resurrection of the body at the end of the age, the Psalmist’s prophecy that the coming Messiah would not see decay, that his kingdom was everlasting, followed by Jesus’ appeal to the sign of Jonah when speaking on several occasions about how he would fulfill the predictions just mentioned.  

Those Jews and the Romans who opposed Jesus’ messianic claims certainly were not regenerate (at least not yet for some of them), but they understood full well what Jesus’ resurrection meant, even if they never came to faith in Jesus and even if they denied that the resurrection ever happened.  Granted, the Jews and Romans had vastly different presuppositions and interpretations of the resurrected Jesus than did Jesus’ followers post-resurrection.  But the resurrection still stands as the supreme fact of Christianity.  Rejection of Jesus’ resurrection as confirmation of his claims does not mean his resurrection never occurred.  There was still an empty tomb, and Jesus continued to appear to his followers.  The rejection of Jesus by unbelievers stemmed from sinful and willful prejudice (whether self-conscious or not)–what Paul describes as the suppression of truth in unrighteousness (Romans 1:18).
 
In this instance, we see the critical difference between Reid and Kant and how their differing understanding of perception impacts how we interpret “facts.”  How do we perceive the world around us?  Directly and spontaneously?  Or is our perception of the world ultimately determined by our a priori mental categories?  Or even through our sinful presuppositions?  Reid, Kant, and Van Til offer quite different answers to these vexing questions.

The Decline of SCSR

Thomas Reid on "Common Sense" (Part Three)

Part Two

Reid on “Common Sense”

For Reid, first principles and common sense are closely related.  In Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Reid writes, “first principles, principles of common sense, common notions, [or] self-evident truths” are “no sooner understood than they are believed.  The judgment follows the apprehension of them necessarily, and both are equally the work of nature, and the result of our original powers” (Reid, Intellectual Powers, in Works of, 1:452).  Previously, Reid identified common sense as “necessary to all men for their being and preservation, and therefore it is unconditionally given to all men by the Author of Nature” (Reid, Intellectual Powers, in Works of, 1:412).

More specifically, common sense refers to “the consent of ages and nations, of the learned and unlearned, [which] ought to have great authority with regard to first principles, where every man is a competent judge” (Reid, Intellectual Powers, in Works of, 1:464).  Such principles are identified as common sense because they are common to humanity and held by all people across time and cultures.  Reid grounds his belief in common sense in an empirically justified generalization that this is the necessary state of affairs for humans to know anything–especially that the external world exists.  To put it simply; this is “common sense” because it is demonstrably common to all of humanity.  If all people see an object, and then universally assign the same qualities to that object, without any prior explanation or self-reflection required before doing so, this can only because their knowledge of that object is “true.”  All people instinctively think this way, unless convinced to doubt this knowledge by teachers of the ideal theory.  

While Reid argued common sense was virtually self-evident because universal (in this regard, Reid is a foundationalist of a sort), his critics then and now, attacked him at this very point by claiming his common sense philosophy was nothing more than an appeal to majority opinion–the “wisdom of the vulgar.”  If true, this chips away at the very idea of the supposed universality of Reid’s first principles.  If common sense is really nothing but popular opinion verified by counting noses, and by observing how the uneducated rabble make decisions, then such first principles amount to nothing of value in settling truth claims.  No philosopher worthy of the name would dare make such an appeal.  

But Reid anticipated this line of criticism and as a good Newtonian, made clear that his first principles were actually empirical and psychological observations, reflecting the way people actually think and interact with the world around them.  To give this point some teeth, at several places, Reid appeals to universal elements in the structure of human language (anticipating the later work of G. E. Moore and J. L. Austin).  Reid points out that all human language is built upon a distinction between the active and passive voice, and that all languages distinguish between the qualities of things, and the things themselves.  This goes a long way toward making Reid’s point.   

To put it another way, Reid’s first principles are not true because most people accept them.  Nor are they true because this is how the common man or woman expresses themselves when asked about how they know what they know.  Rather, people think and interact with the world as they do, precisely because this is how their creator has made them to think and act.  Reid, to my knowledge does not refer to the “divine image” while discussing these common sense capabilities–although he does speak of the divine image in humanity when discussing moral liberty, and conscience (Reid, Active Powers of Man, in Works of, II.564, 585, 615).  But are not the abilities given us by our creator something akin to humans reflecting the image of their creator?  We are born with the capacity to utilize these first principles without any self-reflection, or without being able to give any reasons for doing so.  This is how God made us, and is his way of enabling and equipping his creatures to live in the world which he has made.

Part Four

Thomas Reid on "First Principles" (Part Two)

Part One: Who Was Thomas Reid?

Reid on "First Principles"

       
The great conundrum faced by philosophers since time immemorial is the question “how do we know what we know?”  This question falls under the sub-category of philosophy known as epistemology.  Those who contend that all human knowledge arises through our senses are called “empiricists.”  Those who believe that our knowledge is grounded in our ideas (i.e. our mental powers and state of mind) are often identified as “idealists.”  

Enter the much better known contemporary of Reid, the German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1722-1804), whose volume Critique of Pure Reason, was first published in 1781.  What made Kant’s philosophy so important and ground-breaking was that Kant made a compelling case that while all knowledge begins with sense perception–the data received via our senses–the knowing process does not end there.  Without the mind having the innate ability to act upon these sensations so as to transform them into knowledge, the world would remain unintelligible to us despite the data coming from our senses.  Kant believed that there are specific mental categories which owe nothing to experience, and which are hard-wired into us which shape those sensations we do receive.  

These so-called a priori categories (i.e., they are in place before we experience the world) include notions of time and space, logic, and mathematics.  A creature without such categories would have the same sensations and see the same appearances we do, but would have an entirely different experience of them.  My dog and I see the same tree.  Since he does not have the mental categories I have, we experience the same tree quite differently.  According to Kant, we see not “the thing in itself,” but only the thing as interpreted by our minds according to the a priori categories.  This is reflected in Kant’s well-known distinction between the noumenal (the world beyond experience but which can reasonably be inferred from experience) and the phenomenal (the world which is actually experienced and accessed through the senses).

Reid, it has been said, worked backward from Hume’s skepticism to ask, “what would be necessary” if we are to know the world as it is?  Reid wonders “what capacities must the human mind possess in order to truly know the external world?”  He classifies these capacities as “first principles” which he believes are grounded in the so-called “common sense” of humanity.  These principles are simply assumed and cannot be proven.  We utilize them without any prior reflection upon them, nor can we “prove” them, because to do so we must utilize the very capabilities we are trying to prove.  Although people universally reason from these first principles even if they do not believe in God, whenever we seek to get behind “common sense” to discover why things are the way they are, Reid argues there is no way to explain the existence of these first principles and the common sense of humanity apart from God who created the world and has designed us to live and act within that world.  Reid writes,

I thank the Author of my being, who bestowed it upon me before the eyes of my reason were opened, and still bestows it upon me, to be my guide where reason leaves me in the dark.  And now I yield to the direction of my senses, not from instinct only, but from confidence and trust in a faithful and beneficent Monitor, grounded upon the experience of his paternal care and goodness.  In all this, I deal with the Author of my being, no otherwise than I thought it reasonable to deal with my parents and tutors.  I believed by instinct whatever they told me, long before I had the idea of a lie, or thought of the possibility of their deceiving me (Reid, Inquiry, in Works of, I.184).

The theistic implications of Reid’s first principles ought not be overlooked.  We reason via common sense because our Creator has designed us to do so.

Immanuel KantSince Kant too was awakened through his interactions with Hume, we should not be surprised that both Reid and Kant were chasing the same goal.  Reid wanted to challenge Hume’s skepticism, as did Kant–albeit Kant’s method of doing so was quite different than Reid’s.  Reid appealed to those things assumed by all humans in all ages and across all cultures–identifying those first principles which ground human knowledge in the real world–and in not mere experience or in mental categories.  This makes Reid a “common sense realist”–we do indeed apprehend the world as it is through ordinary daily activity.  Reid really ought not be classified as a pure empiricist, although he does fit within the empiricist camp.  Kant, on the other hand, thought the best way to do this was to define the limits of human reason by identifying those a priori mental categories which transform mere appearances of things into our knowledge of them.  Kant’s so-called “transcendental idealism” sets out the premise that knowledge begins when we receive appearances of external things via sense perception, but we cannot regard these appearances as objects of knowledge until our minds organize these appearances through a set of fixed a priori categories already present in the mind.

The critical issue with which Reid and Kant were wrestling is that we all have to start the knowing process somewhere.  But where, exactly?  We must assume certain things to be true and already in place in our minds from our earliest years of self-consciousness and prior to experience of the world, otherwise our sensations would remain just that–mere sensations and never pass into knowledge.  

Reid identified two types of first principles–necessary (certain) and contingent (probable) which provide the a priori framework to necessary understand the external world (Reid, Intellectual Powers, in Works of, 1:435).  Those first principles Reid identified as “necessary” (i.e., it is impossible to deny them) include logic (i.e., the law of non-contradiction) certain rules of grammar, mathematics, morals (unjust actions cause harm) and metaphysical realities–what we perceive actually exists.  Reid is certain that God would never allow an evil demon to deceive us as Descartes once wondered.  Reid also believed that whatever exists has a cause–in direct opposition to Hume’s skepticism about accepting things as “true” which he could not actually observe.
    
Those first principles which Reid identified as “contingent” include things such as consciousness of our own person (self-awareness), knowledge of the external world, that what I remember really did happen, that my personal identity truly exists as far back as I can remember, and that those things which I see and perceive really do exist.  Reid also argued that we have power as human agents to determine our own actions (we learn about causality, through our own agentic powers, as when infants, we strike the mobile above our heads which causes it to move), that we are able to tell truth from error, we know that other minds exist, and that human testimony is ordinarily true unless we have good reasons to believe otherwise.  Reid added that the future course of the world will be similar to what it has been in the past.

Reid was clear as to the importance he placed upon such first principles.

All reasoning must be from first principles, and for first principles no other reason can be given but this, that, by the constitution of our nature, we are under a necessity of assenting to them.  Such principles are part of our constitution, no less than the power of thinking:  reason can neither make nor destroy them; nor can it do anything without them. . . . A mathematician cannot prove the truth of his axioms, nor can he prove anything unless he takes them for granted.  We cannot prove the existence of our minds, nor even of our thoughts and sensations.  A historian, or a witness, can prove nothing unless it be taken for granted that the memory and senses may be trusted (Reid, Inquiry, in Works of, 1:130).

To deny these principles, Reid thinks, is absurd.

We must start the knowing process by assuming certain capacities are in place whether we can prove this or not.  Reid begins with first principles, both necessary and contingent.  Kant, on the other hand, rejects Reid’s realism, instead contending that we cannot see things as they really are, only our perceptions of them mediated through his famous “categories.”

Part Three

Who Was Thomas Reid and Why Does His "Common Sense Philosophy" Still Matter (Part One)

  
Reid's Official PortraitThomas Reid (April 10, 1710 – October 7, 1796) is best known as the founder and principal philosopher of “common sense,” or more properly, “Scottish Common Sense Realism” (SCSR).  Reid was highly respected and quite influential in the days of the eighteenth century Scottish Enlightenment, but the popularity of Reid and his common sense philosophy quickly faded in subsequent generations.  Although destined for relative obscurity, Reid’s influence did remain strong in several quarters.  Of late, there has been a Reidian resurgence of sorts, reflected in several volumes about Reid’s philosophy, the publication of a new critical edition of his works (by the University of Edinburgh), and through favorable treatment by so-called “Reformed Epistemologists,” Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff.  

The purpose of this series is to introduce Thomas Reid’s philosophy of “common sense,” which, I believe, has been far too long misunderstood and therefore neglected, and which still has an important role to play in formulating a “common sense” apologetic for the Christian religion–an apologetic which centers in the bodily resurrection of Jesus Christ as Christianity’s chief truth claim.

 
The Life and Times of Thomas Reid

Reid was born and raised in Strachan, near Aberdeen, Scotland.  The son of a Church of Scotland minister (the Rev. Lewis Reid, 1676-1762), Reid’s mother was Margaret Gregory, one of twenty-nine children, and from the famed Gregory clan.  Her first cousin, James Gregory (1638–1675), was a respected mathematician and astronomer who invented the reflecting telescope.  Reid began attending Marischal College in Aberdeen in 1723, and graduated Master in 1726.  Reid was only 16, but this was typical for the time.  Reid was greatly influenced by his teacher, George Turnbull.  Turnbull was a follower of idealist philosopher Bishop George Berkeley–Reid later came to oppose the Bishop with great vigor, as he did the empiricist philosophers John Locke and David Hume.  During his time at Marischal, Reid became thoroughly acquainted with Isaac Newton’s Principia Mathmatica, and showed much appreciation for Newton throughout the course of his career.

Before becoming a philosopher, Reid served as a parish minister.  He was licensed to preach by the Church of Scotland in 1731, and briefly pursued theological studies after licensure.  In 1737, Reid was ordained and took a pastoral call to a small church in New Machar (near Aberdeen).  While in New Machar (1740) Reid married his wife, Elizabeth.  Together they had nine children–eight of whom, sadly, Reid outlived.  Little is known about Reid’s ministry in New Machar, but the story circulates that he was not near as popular in the parish as was his wife.  This was due to rumors that Reid was given his call through patronage–an unpopular practice in small, rural parishes like New Machar.  

It is likely that Reid belonged to the “moderate party” of Hugh Blair (a popular Scottish minister).  The so-called “Moderates” focused on Christian morality, not the Calvinistic doctrines found in the Westminster Standards, to which all ministers of the Church of Scotland were required give to affirmation.  Reid’s sermons are lost to us, but his deep personal faith and piety is expressed in a prayer in which he praised God for his providential mercy after Elizabeth had been spared during a serious illness.

While in New Machar, Reid continued to read and study philosophy, specifically the work of  Glasgow moral philosopher Francis Hutcheson and his influential book, Inquiry into the Origins of the Ideas of Beauty and Virtue.  Reid also read and digested fellow Scot David Hume’s Treatise on Human Nature (1738-40).  Reid’s first publication, an essay On Quantity, was published for the Royal Society in October of 1748.  This is a good indication that philosophical interests–not theological matters–were driving Reid’s intellectual life even while serving in the parish.

In 1751, Reid took a professorship at King’s College Aberdeen, becoming a teacher, lecturer and regent.  In accepting this call, Reid was required to give up his ordination and did so in 1752.  Along with John Gregory and other notable intellectuals, Reid founded the Aberdeen Philosophical Society (popularly known as the “Wise Club”), which continued meeting until 1773.  During this time, Reid completed his doctoral work, but did not publish his first book until 1764, An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense, when Reid had reached the age of 54.  As was the case with Immanuel Kant, who claimed to be awakened from his “dogmatic slumbers” after reading a German translation of David Hume’s Treatise, Reid too was stirred by Hume–in Reid’s case by Hume’s An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, first published in 1748.  Hume’s published works were a continual source of discussion within the Wise Club, and Reid’s Inquiry is thought to be largely based upon lectures developed for Wise Club discussions.  
 
David HumeReid’s Inquiry was primarily a response to Hume, but Reid also took aim at other advocates of the so-called “ideal theory.”  According to Reid, in addition to Hume, those who held the “ideal theory” included Rene Decartes, John Locke, and George Berkeley.  Ideal theorists placed the mind and our ideas between sensation of the external world and our knowledge of it.  Ideal theorists were necessarily skeptical of the even the possibility of direct knowledge of the external world–although they never expressed their skepticism as boldly as the logic of their theories dictated.  Reid, who quickly became Hume’s most powerful critic, sought to challenge what Reid identified as the “monster of skepticism” given life by Hume.  If anything characterizes Reid’s philosophical work, it is his fierce opposition to all forms of epistemological skepticism typified by his Inquiry.  Reid’s challenge to the ideal theorist still stands.  Can your philosophy actually assure us of the existence of the external world?  Or does the author (however unintentionally) ultimately drive us to skepticism by placing a representational or mental “theory of ideas” between the world which exists and our perception of it.

Shortly before Reid’s Inquiry was published, he was offered the prestigious Professorship of Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow, where he became the immediate successor to Adam Smith (1723-1790), the author of the influential Wealth of Nations (1776).  Reid accepted this call and remained at Glasgow until his retirement in 1781.  Productive in his retirement, Reid turned his university lectures into the books, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (1785) and Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind (1788).  

In these volumes on intellectual and active (and agentic) powers, Reid defends a libertarian notion of human freedom–i.e., that human agency is responsible for free actions of men and women, who are morally accountable for their choices.  But Reid thought his view perfectly compatible with the Westminster Standards which prescribes the agency, but not the causality of human action in light of the mystery of “the predestination and foreknowledge of God in conjunction with the liberty of man” (Reid, "Prescience and Liberty," in Works of, II.977).

Reid also directly attacked Hume’s notion of personal identity, in which Hume famously held that human identity is nothing but the on-going memory of our experiences over time.  Hume once wondered whether he still existed while he slept, and if his existence was reconstituted each morning upon awakening.  Reid appreciated Hume’s wit, but held that any sequence of memories we may have is grossly insufficient to ground personal identity and self-awareness, which are common sense beliefs held by all–even by those like Hume, though the latter candidly admitted to doubting them. 

One of Reid’s most effective methods of criticism of his opponents was to argue that philosophers like Hume often raised provocative questions in the safety of their private studies, boldly going against widely accepted “common sense” human convictions of the day (i.e., causality and on-going personal identity).  As Reid pointed out, such men cannot live out their philosophical convictions in the real world they actually inhabit.  Reid playfully jabbed Hume, stating that if he (Reid) chooses not to believe my senses, “I break my nose against a post that comes in my way, I step into a dirty kennel; and after twenty such wise and rational actions I am taken up and clapped into a madhouse” (Reid, Inquiry, in Works of, 1:184).  Hume may question whether there is a third thing (causality) between the billiard ball and cue which strikes it, but presumably such skepticism never stopped Hume from playing billiards.  Hume’s theory does not stop us (nor Hume) from trusting our senses.

By all accounts, Reid was a modest and humble man, well-liked, and widely respected.  His obituary (in the Glasgow Courier) describes his as “a life distinguished by an ardent love of truth, an assiduous pursuit of it in various sciences, by the most amiable simplicity in manners, gentleness of temper, strength of affection, candour, and liberality of expression.”

Thomas Reid on "First Principles"

B. B. Warfield's First Pastoral Call

Amy Mantravadi has written an important essay on B. B. Warfield's first pastoral call in Dayton, Ohio.  I encourage you to take a look:  B. B. Warfield in Dayton

She writes,

The fallout from this event was exactly what you might expect. The presbytery “passed resolutions reflecting on the congregation for ill-usage of their pastor” and required that this be read from the pulpit. We are then told that, “The Church session entered a strong protest in its minutes.” Anyone who has ever been forced to suffer through a tense church committee meeting can now sympathize with what was taking place.

Into this tense situation stepped the young B.B. Warfield. By the time he arrived in Dayton, the congregation had been without a permanent minister for almost two years. Due to the dispute with the local presbytery, they were likely viewed as somewhat toxic. How exactly Warfield was chosen to serve as their supply pastor, I cannot say, but he was no doubt viewed by some not as a lion, but rather as a lamb prepared for the slaughter. Completely lacking in pastoral experience, the odds against his success were long indeed.

B. B. Warfield and William James on the Difference Between Moralism and True Religion

In his short essay, "What Is Calvinism?" (from the Presbyterian, Mar. 2, 1904, 6-7), B. B. Warfield writes,

"`There is a state of mind' says Professor William James in his lectures on `The Varieties of Religious Experience,' `known to religious men, but to no others, in which the will to assert ourselves and hold our own has been displaced by a willingness to close our mouths and be as nothing in the floods and waterspouts of God.  [James] is describing what he looks upon as the truly religious mood over against what he calls `mere moralism'  `The moralist' he tells us, `must hold his breath and keep his muscles tense': and things go well with him only when he can do so.  The religious man, on the contrary, finds his consolation in his very powerlessness; his trust is not in himself but in his God; and the `hour of his moral death turns into his spiritual birthday."

Says Warfield in response, "the psychological analyst [William James] has caught the exact distinction between moralism and religion.  It is the distinction between trust in ourselves and trust in God.  And when trust in ourselves is driven entirely out, and trust in God comes in, in its purity, we have Calvinism.  Under the name of religion at its height, what Professor James has really described is therefore just Calvinism."

William James, by the way, once called himself a Methodist without the Savior.

B. B. Warfield's Theological Legacy

It is, of course, extremely difficult to estimate with any precision the extent of B. B. Warfield's impact upon subsequent theological developments after his death.  Nevertheless, there are several important indicators that clearly indicate Warfield's powerful and lasting influence upon the American theological scene.  One such indicator is that Warfield himself was responsible for the primary theological training of over 2700 students during his tenure at Princeton (Noll, The Princeton Theology, 19).  Since the classroom was his domain of sorts, his personal influence upon his students was, no doubt, quite significant and certainly lived on for at least one generation subsequent to Warfield's death in 1921.  This particular legacy can be seen most clearly in the work of Warfield's successor of sorts, J. Gresham Machen, and the eventual split in the Presbyterian church leading to the founding of Westminster Theological Seminary.  While Machen was the most notable minister trained by Warfield, nevertheless, his influence upon a whole generation of clergymen trained in his classroom is certainly a significant reason why Warfield’s legacy has survived.

To read the rest of this essay, Click here: Riddleblog - B. B. Warfield's Theological Legacy

A Short Biography of B. B. Warfield (1851-1921)

“One Productive Life” – A Short Biography of  B. B. Warfield

Abridged from my Ph.D. dissertation, "The Lion of Princeton"

Princeton College alumni who remembered Benjamin Breckinridge Warfield's student days at Princeton recall that on November 6, 1870, the young Warfield and a certain James Steen, "distinguished themselves by indulging in a little Sunday fight in front of the chapel after Dr. McCosh's afternoon lecture."  Warfield, it seems, "in lieu of taking notes" during Dr. McCosh's lecture, took great delight in sketching an "exceedingly uncomplimentary picture of Steen," which was subsequently circulated among the students (Hugh Thomson Kerr, "Warfield:  The Person Behind the Theology,"  1995, 21).  The resulting fist-fight between the two young men ultimately didn't amount to much, though years later many still remembered Warfield's nickname earned that Sunday—"the pugilist" (21-22.).

It may be instructive to note that B. B. Warfield's earliest days at Princeton, as well as his last, are characterized by a passionate defense of his personal honor.  Princeton Seminary colleague, Oswald T. Allis, tells the story about Dr. Warfield's encounter with Mrs. Stevenson, the wife of the Seminary President, shortly before Warfield's death and during the height of the controversy at Princeton over an "inclusive" Presbyterian church.  When Mrs. Stevenson and Dr. Warfield passed each other on the walk outside the Seminary, some pleasantries were exchanged, and then Mrs. Stevenson reportedly said to the good doctor, "Oh, Dr. Warfield, I am praying that everything will go harmoniously at the [General] Assembly!"  To which Warfield responded, "Why, Mrs. Stevenson, I am praying that there may be a fight" (O. T. Allis, "Personal Impressions of Dr Warfield," in The Banner of Truth 89, Fall 1971, 10-14).  As Hugh Kerr, formerly Warfield Professor of Theology at Princeton Theological Seminary reflects, "from the very beginning to end, Warfield was a fighter" (Kerr, "Warfield:  The Person Behind the Theology," 22).

B. B. Warfield was not only a fighter, he was also a theological giant, exerting significant influence upon American Presbyterianism for nearly forty-years.  John DeWitt, professor of Church History at Princeton during the Warfield years, told Warfield biographer Samuel Craig, that “he had known intimately the three great Reformed theologians of America of the preceding generation—Charles Hodge, W. G. T. Shedd and Henry B. Smith—and that he was not only certain that Warfield knew a great deal more than any one of them but that he was disposed to think that he knew more than all three of them put together” (Samuel G. Craig, "Benjamin B. Warfield," in B. B. Warfield, Biblical and Theological Studies, P & R,1986, xvii). This was quite an accolade from one (DeWitt) who was himself a man of great scholarship.  Unlike many of today's "specialists," B. B. Warfield was fully qualified to teach any of the major seminary subjects—New Testament, Church History, Systematic or Biblical Theology, and Apologetics (xix.).

Click here: Riddleblog - A Very Productive Life

Reading Warfield . . . Where to Begin?

I recently received an email from someone (Mike Swope) asking what I thought was a great question.  Since B. B. Warfield is such an important theologian, and such a prolific writer (on the order of a Barth, or an Aquinas), where should someone begin if they wish to become more familiar with the Lion of Princeton?

I can answer this in one of two ways.  First, there would be my list of favorite Warfield pieces.  This would include a number of things "off the beaten path" so to speak (some of my favorites are more technical or obscure book reviews and journal articles). Then there would be the list of those essays/books which highlight Warfield's career and importance.  What follows is the latter (although there is some overlap).

Since much of Warfield's work is easily accessible (in the ten-volume set from Baker Books, or the five-volume set from P & R, from Warfield's Selected Shorter Writings from P & R,  or even on-line), let me set out a list of a few things just to get you started.  This list is suggestive only, and is by no means exhaustive.

Online sources:  Here's a great list (Click here: Warfield Index).  To get started, I'd simply suggest that you pick essays based upon your personal interests--Warfield wrote on virtually every theological topic of his day. 

Some of these essays are quite basic (i.e., introductory articles for encyclopedias or magazines), while others are much more technical (and written for theological journals).  But be sure not to miss the following (which include a sermon, a book review, and several ground-breaking articles on critical topics--just so you get a flavor of the scope of Warfield's massive output and mastery of his subject):

Click here: Warfield - On Faith in Its Psychological Aspects

Click here: Warfield - Faith

 

Click here: Warfield - On the Antiquity and the Unity of the Human Race

Click here: Warfield - Trinity

Click here: Warfield - The Person of Christ

Click here: Warfield - The Inspiration of the Bible

Click here: Warfield - The Real Problem of Inspiration

Click here: Warfield - A Review of Lewis Sperry Chafer's "He That Is Spiritual"

Click here: Warfield - The Christ that Paul Preached

Click here: Warfield - Calvin as a Theologian

Click here: Warfield - The Theology of the Reformation

Click here: Warfield - Mysticism and Christianity

Books:

It is my humble opinion that every Reformed Christian should read Warfield's The Inspiration and Authority of the Bible.  There is nothing like it.  It has generated no end of controversy (although it defends inerrancy) and although Warfield is crystal clear, his critics consistently misquote or misrepresent him.   This book is too important not to read.  Click here: P & R Publishing: Individual Title

I would also suggest reading Warfield's Plan of Salvation (which is available on-line--Click here: Warfield - The Plan of Salvation).

Every seminarian should read this short essay:  Click here: P & R Publishing: Individual Title

Essays: 

Since Warfield's main efforts are found in theological journals, here are a few which have been reprinted (in books) and which I think are must reading:

From Biblical and Theological Studies (P & R): "The Spirit of God in the Old Testament" (127 ff.).

From Studies in Perfectionism (P & R):  "The Theology of Charles G. Finney" (166 ff.).

From The Person and Work of Christ (P & R): "The Emotional Life of Our Lord" (93 ff.); "Christless Christianity" (265 ff.), "Imitating the Incarnation" (563 ff.).

From Calvin and Augustine (P & R):  "Calvin's Doctrine of the Knowledge of God" (29 ff.); "Augustine's Doctrine of Knowledge and Authority" (387 ff.).

From Studies in Theology (Baker): "Predestination in the Reformed Confessions" (117 ff); "Charles Darwin's Religious Life" (541 ff.). 

From Selected Shorter Writings, Vol 1:  "How to Get Rid of Christianity" (51 ff.);  "Hosea VI.7:  Adam or Man?" (116 ff.); "Jesus Christ the Propitiation for the Whole World" (167 ff.); "The Resurrection of Christ:  A Historical Fact" (178 ff.); "Antichrist" (356 ff.).

From Selected Shorter Writings, Vol 2:  "A Review of Herman Bavinck's De Zeherheid des Geloofs" (106 ff.); "Darwin's Arguments and Christianity and Religion" (132 ff.); "Review of John Miley's Systematic Theology" (308 ff.); "A Calm View of the Freedmen's Case" (735ff.)

This will get you started, but will barely scratch the surface of the body of Warfield's work.